Riley v. Bondi, Attorney General
No. 23-1270 · Decided June 26, 2025 · Vacated and remanded
Whether the 30-day filing deadline for judicial review of a "final order of removal" under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(1) is a jurisdictional requirement or a mandatory claims-processing rule. The Court held that the 30-day filing deadline in 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(1) is a non-jurisdictional claims-processing rule, but that the "final order of removal" triggering this deadline is the FARO, not a subsequent BIA order from withholding-only proceedings.
CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT · Argued March 24, 2025
Parties — Petitioner: RILEY · Respondent: BONDI, ATTORNEY GENERAL
Vote & lineup5–4 on the judgment. Alito delivered the opinion of the Court, joined by Roberts, Thomas, Kavanaugh, Barrett, Sotomayor, Kagan, Gorsuch, Jackson (9). Dissent(s): Sotomayor (joined by Kagan, Jackson, Gorsuch). Concurrence(s): Thomas.
Who prevailed — Petitioner prevailed on the issue of the deadline's jurisdictional status, while respondent (via amicus) prevailed on the definition of the final order; however, because the Government declined to press for dismissal based on the non-jurisdictional rule, the case was vacated and remanded.
The question

Whether the 30-day filing deadline for judicial review of a "final order of removal" under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(1) is a jurisdictional requirement or a mandatory claims-processing rule. Whether an alien can obtain review of a Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) decision in "withholding-only" proceedings by filing a petition for review within 30 days of that BIA decision. Whether the issuance of a "final administrative review order" (FARO) constitutes the "final order of removal" for purposes of triggering the § 1252(b)(1) deadline, regardless of subsequent withholding-only proceedings.

Petitioner's argument
  • Argued that an order denying withholding of removal or relief under the Convention Against Torture (CAT) should mark the point in time of a "final order" because it occurs last and enables the FARO to be executed.
  • Contended that the 30-day filing deadline in § 1252(b)(1) is a "quintessential claim-processing rule" rather than a jurisdictional bar.
  • Sought reversal of the Fourth Circuit's dismissal of his petition for review.
Respondent's argument
  • The Government argued that while a CAT order is not itself a final removal order, a previously issued removal order does not become "final" until withholding-only proceedings conclude.
  • The appointed amicus argued that the 30-day deadline is jurisdictional, relying on *Stone v. INS* as a definitive interpretation.
  • Sought affirmation of the judgment below (via amicus) or a finding that the removal order was not yet final for filing purposes (via Government).
The decision
  • Held that BIA orders denying deferral of removal in "withholding-only" proceedings are not "final orders of removal" under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(1).
  • Reasoned that under 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(47)(A), an order of removal must conclude the alien is deportable or order deportation; here, the FARO performed this function.
  • Determined that under 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(47)(B), a removal order becomes final upon BIA affirmation or expiration of the period to petition the BIA; in streamlined proceedings, this period expires immediately upon issuance of the FARO.
  • Relied on *Nasrallah v. Barr* for the principle that CAT orders are not final removal orders and do not disturb the validity of a final order of removal.
  • Invoked *Johnson v. Guzman Chavez* to conclude that the finality of an order of removal does not depend on the outcome of withholding-only proceedings.
  • Held that the 30-day filing deadline in § 1252(b)(1) is a claims-processing rule, not a jurisdictional requirement.
  • Applied the test from *Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp.*, finding Congress did not "clearly state" the provision has jurisdictional consequences and lacked language "demarcating a court's power" as required by *Harrow v. Department of Defense*.
  • Noted that *Stone v. INS* used the term "jurisdictional" loosely and did not attend to modern distinctions between jurisdictional and mandatory rules, citing *Santos-Zacaria v. Garland*.
Separate opinions
Thomas, concurring
  • Argues the Fourth Circuit may still lack jurisdiction because 112 Stat. 2681–822 (§ 2242) prohibits review of CAT claims "except as part of the review of a final order of removal."
  • Contends that since petitioner did not seek review of the actual final order of removal, the court cannot review the CAT order in isolation.
Sotomayor, dissenting (joined by Kagan, Jackson, Gorsuch)
  • Joins the majority's finding that the deadline is non-jurisdictional but dissents on the timing of "finality," arguing it is incoherent to require an appeal before a BIA order exists.
  • Argues that requiring such a result violates the policy against piecemeal litigation, citing *McLish v. Roff* and *Catlin v. United States*.
  • Distinguishes *Johnson v. Guzman Chavez*, arguing that "administrative finality" for detention purposes under § 1231 differs from "finality" for appellate review under § 1252.
Read the full opinion on supremecourt.gov (PDF) →