Does a state prisoner have Article III standing to bring a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim challenging the constitutionality of state postconviction DNA testing procedures under the Due Process Clause? Specifically, is such a claim redressable via a declaratory judgment if the state prosecutor may still deny testing on other grounds? Additionally, does a defendant's mid-appeal assertion that they will not change their substantive decision moot a procedural due process challenge?

• Texas's Article 64, as interpreted by state courts, creates an insurmountable barrier to DNA testing by requiring a showing of actual innocence of the underlying crime.
• It is fundamentally unfair and violates the Due Process Clause to allow prisoners to file habeas petitions challenging a death sentence while preventing them from obtaining the DNA testing necessary to support those petitions.
• A declaratory judgment would redress his injury by removing the unlawful justification used by the respondent to deny access to evidence.
• The suit is not moot simply because the respondent claims he will refuse testing regardless of the court's ruling.

• Petitioner lacks standing because a declaratory judgment would be unlikely to cause the prosecutor to "reverse course and allow testing."
• Redressability is absent because there are multiple independent state-law grounds, beyond the one challenged, that justify denying the DNA testing.
• The case is moot because the respondent refused the DNA testing request even after the District Court issued its declaratory judgment.

• Petitioner has standing to challenge Texas's postconviction DNA testing procedures under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
• Under *District Attorney's Office for Third Judicial Dist. v. Osborne*, convicted individuals have a "liberty interest in demonstrating [their] innocence with new evidence under state law."
• Following *Skinner v. Switzer*, a prisoner may use 42 U.S.C. § 1983 to allege that state procedures unconstitutionally prevent them from obtaining such testing.
• Applying the test from *Reed v. Goertz*, a federal court order declaring that postconviction DNA testing procedures violate due process redresses injury by "eliminat[ing]" the prosecutor's reliance on those procedures as a justification for denial.
• The Court rejects the Fifth Circuit's approach of guessing whether a favorable decision will ultimately result in the evidence being turned over, noting that removing an unconstitutional barrier is sufficient for redressability.
• Citing *Federal Election Comm'n v. Akins* and *Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife*, the Court notes that standing exists to challenge an improper legal ground even if the official might later reach the same result for a different reason.
• The claim is not moot; a defendant cannot "manufacture mootness" by promising that the substantive outcome will remain the same regardless of the procedures required.