Does the Sixth Amendment permit the use of a screen to obscure a child witness's view of the defendant based solely on a mandatory state statute? Specifically, is a case-specific finding of necessity required before such a screen can be used in a child-abuse case? Does a state's general legislative finding of necessity satisfy the constitutional requirements for denying a defendant the right to face-to-face confrontation?

• The use of the screen violated his Sixth Amendment right to confront his accuser face to face.
• The State failed to meet its burden of showing that screening was necessary in the particular circumstances of his case.
• The trial court's reliance on a mandatory statute was insufficient to override the constitutional demands of the Confrontation Clause.
• He sought a new trial as a remedy for this constitutional error.

• The trial court was required to follow Miss. Code Ann. § 99–43–101(2)(g), which provides child witnesses the "righ[t]" to a screen.
• The Mississippi State Constitution (Art. 3, § 26A(3)) empowers the legislature to enact laws to protect the rights of victims.
• The trial court did "hear evidence" and make a "case-specific" finding of necessity based on the representation that the child's guardian believed testifying face to face would be difficult.
• The mandatory nature of the state statute provided sufficient authority for the screening.

• The Court held that the Sixth Amendment tolerates screening in child-abuse cases only if a court "hear[s] evidence" and issues a "case-specific" finding of "the requisite... necessity," citing *Maryland v. Craig*.
• The Court clarified that simply pointing to a state statute that authorizes screening, even one based on "generalized finding[s]" of necessity, is insufficient under *Coy v. Iowa*.
• The Court rejected the argument that the Mississippi State Constitution's victims' rights provision (Art. 3, § 26A(3)) overrides the Sixth Amendment, noting that under Art. VI, cl. 2, the Federal Constitution controls.
• The Court determined that a mandatory statute is "more constitutionally problematic" than a discretionary one because it may bypass the need for case-specific findings.
• The Court noted that while a witness's age is relevant, *Maryland v. Craig* still requires a case-specific finding regardless of whether the child is four or six years old.
• The Court ruled that the right to face-to-face confrontation applies even when the identity of the perpetrator is not in question.
• The Court found that both screens and closed-circuit television deviate from the "face to face" requirement and thus both require a case-specific finding of necessity.
• The Court concluded that the trial court's reliance on the "mandatory" nature of Miss. Code Ann. § 99–43–101(2)(g) and the prosecution's refusal to "put on any proof" fell short of the requirements in *Coy* and *Craig*.
• The Court noted that the error may be subject to the "harmless-error" rule under *Chapman v. California*, which requires the prosecution to show "beyond a reasonable doubt that the error complained of did not contribute to the verdict obtained."