Does 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(3)(E), which prohibits certiorari review of a court of appeals' authorization decision for a second or successive habeas application, apply to federal prisoners seeking relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2255? Additionally, does the "old-claim bar" in 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(1), which requires the dismissal of claims previously presented in a prior application, apply to second or successive motions filed by federal prisoners under 28 U.S.C. § 2255(h)? The case specifically addresses whether the cross-reference in § 2255(h) to § 2244 imports these specific restrictions.

• § 2244(b)(3)(E) does not apply because it refers to "second or successive applications," whereas federal prisoners file "motions" under § 2255(e).
• The certiorari bar is a post-certification event and does not relate to the process of how a panel certifies a motion, which is the only part incorporated by § 2255(h).
• § 2244(b)(1) applies only to state prisoners because its text explicitly references "habeas corpus application under section 2254."
• Federal prisoners should not be subject to the old-claim bar because § 2255(h) provides its own distinct substantive requirements.

• The cross-reference in § 2255(h) to § 2244 imports the certiorari bar found in § 2244(b)(3)(E).
• It would be inconsistent and illogical to bar certiorari for state prisoners but allow it for federal prisoners.
• § 2244(b)(1) applies to federal prisoners because § 2255(h) incorporates § 2244(b)(3)(C), which requires a prima facie showing that the filing satisfies the "requirements of this subsection" (including § 2244(b)(1)).
• The 30-day deadline for panel decisions in § 2244(b)(3)(D) implies that the decision should be final and not subject to lengthy certiorari review.

• The Court held that § 2244(b)(3)(E) does not bar certiorari review of authorization decisions for federal prisoners.
• Applying the rule from *Castro v. United States*, the Court reasoned that Congress must "speak clearly" to strip the Court of its broad certiorari jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1254(1).
• The Court found that § 2255(h)'s cross-reference is narrow, incorporating only the procedures for how a panel certifies a motion, not post-certification bars like § 2244(b)(3)(E).
• The Court further held that § 2244(b)(1)'s old-claim bar does not apply to federal prisoners.
• The Court relied on the plain text of § 2244(b)(1), which specifically targets "application[s] under section 2254," whereas federal prisoners file "motions" under § 2255.
• Invoking *Henson v. Santander Consumer USA Inc.*, the Court presumed that the different terminology ("applications" vs. "motions") conveys a difference in meaning.
• The Court rejected the argument that § 2255(h) incorporates § 2244(b)(1) via § 2244(b)(3)(C), noting that doing so would make the more lenient "newly discovered evidence" standard in § 2255(h)(1) a "dead letter" compared to the stricter standard in § 2244(b)(2)(B).
• The Court noted that AEDPA treats state and federal prisoners differently to respect "comity, finality, and federalism" regarding state courts, concerns that do not apply to federal judgments.