Bost et al. v. Illinois State Board of Elections et al.
No. 24-568 · Decided January 14, 2026 · reversed and remanded
Whether political candidates have standing under Article III of the Constitution to challenge state rules governing the counting of votes in their elections. A political candidate has standing under Article III to challenge the rules governing the counting of votes in their election based on their particularized interest in the integrity of the electoral process.
CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT · Argued October 8, 2025
Parties — Petitioner: BOST et al. · Respondent: ILLINOIS STATE BOARD OF ELECTIONS et al.
Vote & lineup7–2 on the judgment. Roberts delivered the opinion of the Court, joined by Thomas, Alito, Gorsuch, Kavanaugh (5). Dissent(s): Jackson (joined by Sotomayor). Concurrence(s): Barrett (joined by Kagan).
Who prevailed — The petitioner, Congressman Michael Bost, prevailed on the issue of standing, and the judgment of the Seventh Circuit was reversed and remanded.
The question

Whether political candidates have standing under Article III of the Constitution to challenge state rules governing the counting of votes in their elections. Specifically, the Court addresses whether a candidate must demonstrate a substantial risk of losing the election or incurring financial loss to establish a "personal stake" in the outcome. The dispute arises from Illinois law allowing the counting of mail-in ballots received up to two weeks after election day.

Petitioner's argument
  • They are entitled to have election results certified using only votes received in compliance with federal Election Day statutes, specifically 2 U.S.C. § 7 and 3 U.S.C. § 1.
  • The late counting of ballots requires the expenditure of additional campaign resources, such as funding poll watchers to monitor late-arriving ballots.
  • An unlawful counting process risks causing a candidate to lose the election or reducing their margin of victory.
  • A diminished margin of victory creates a public perception of poor job performance, which harms the candidate's reputation with voters, donors, and Congressional leadership.
Respondent's argument
  • Petitioners failed to adequately plead a legally cognizable injury in fact.
  • The interests asserted by the candidates are generalized grievances shared by the public rather than particularized injuries.
  • A candidate must demonstrate a substantial risk that the challenged rule will cause them to lose the election or prevent them from achieving a legally significant vote threshold.
  • A candidate must show that the rule will cause specific, concrete reputational or financial damage to satisfy Article III.
The decision
  • The Court held that as a candidate for office, Congressman Bost has standing to challenge the rules governing the counting of votes in his election.
  • Under Article III of the Constitution, a plaintiff must have a "personal stake" in a case, as cited in *FDA v. Alliance for Hippocratic Medicine*.
  • The Court reasoned that candidates have a particularized interest in a fair process and the "integrity of the electoral process," which is distinct from the general interest of voters.
  • The Court found that counting unlawful votes erodes public confidence and undermines a winner's political legitimacy, constituting a "reputational harm," which is a "classic Article III injury" under *TransUnion LLC v. Ramirez* and *Meese v. Keene*.
  • The Court rejected the requirement that a candidate show a substantial risk of losing the election, noting that such a test would convert judges into "political prognosticators" and rely on "unstable ground outside judicial expertise," citing *Rucho v. Common Cause*.
  • The Court further reasoned that requiring a showing of outcome-determinative harm would force litigation to occur on the eve of elections, contradicting the principle in *Purcell v. Gonzalez* and *Republican National Committee v. Democratic National Committee* that courts should avoid altering rules shortly before an election.
  • The Court analogized the situation to a 100-meter dash unexpectedly extended to 105 meters, arguing that all competitors are deprived of the chance to compete under the defined rules regardless of their expected finish.
Separate opinions
Barrett, concurring (joined by Kagan)
  • Argues Bost has standing based on a traditional "pocketbook injury" because he reasonably incurred costs for poll watchers to mitigate a "substantial risk" of harm.
  • Relies on *Clapper v. Amnesty Int'l USA* regarding mitigation costs and *Monsanto Co. v. Geertson Seed Farms* regarding the reasonable probability of harm.
  • Criticizes the majority for creating a "bespoke standing rule" for candidates that relieves them of showing real harm and deviates from standard Article III requirements.
Jackson, dissenting (joined by Sotomayor)
  • Argues Bost lacks standing because an interest in a "fair process" is a generalized grievance shared by all voters, not a particularized injury, citing *United States v. SCRAP*.
  • Contends that the "pocketbook" expenditures are "manufactured standing" based on hypothetical future harm, citing *Clapper v. Amnesty Int'l USA*.
  • Invokes *Los Angeles v. Lyons* to argue that Article III's preconditions cannot be ignored for the sake of fairness or common sense.
Read the full opinion on supremecourt.gov (PDF) →