Whether a single act that violates both 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A)(i) and 18 U.S.C. § 924(j) may yield two convictions—one under each provision—or only one. The case addresses the relationship between the crime of using a firearm in connection with a federal crime of violence and the penalties applied when such a violation causes death. The Court must determine if Congress clearly authorized cumulative punishments for these two provisions.

• The Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment prohibits multiple punishments for the same offense.
• Under the test established in *Blockburger v. United States*, 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A)(i) and 18 U.S.C. § 924(j) define the same offense.
• Congress did not clearly express an intent to overcome the presumption against cumulative punishments for the same offense.

• The consecutive-sentence mandate in 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(D)(ii) textually authorizes dual convictions.
• The two provisions target different wrongs: § 924(c)(1) focuses on firearm use and recidivism, while § 924(j) focuses on the resulting harm of death.
• Allowing only one conviction would permit defendants who cause death to escape the mandatory minimums of § 924(c)(1).
• The physical separation of the subsections in the U.S. Code and their independent sentencing schemes indicate they are separate offenses.

• Congress did not clearly authorize convictions under both 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A)(i) and 18 U.S.C. § 924(j) for a single act; therefore, such an act may spawn only one conviction.
• The Court applied the *Blockburger v. United States* test, finding that the two provisions define the same offense because neither requires proof of a fact which the other does not.
• The Court relied on the *Blockburger* presumption that Congress ordinarily does not intend to punish the same offense under two different statutes.
• The Court found no "plainly expressed" contrary intent in the statutory text, noting that while Congress used "in addition to" language in § 924(c)(1)(A) and § 924(c)(5) to overcome *Blockburger*, it omitted such language regarding the interplay between § 924(c)(1) and § 924(j).
• The Court rejected the argument that the consecutive-sentence mandate in 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(D)(ii) authorizes dual convictions, ruling that *Ball v. United States* and *Rutledge v. United States* distinguish between the permissibility of multiple convictions and the arrangement of sentences.
• The Court dismissed the "different focus" argument, stating that the distinction between a greater offense and a lesser included offense often introduces a new focus, which is insufficient to overcome the presumption under *Whalen v. United States*, *Illinois v. Vitale*, and *Harris v. Oklahoma*.
• The Court noted that *Lora v. United States* confirms that § 924(j) provides sentencing flexibility (including the death penalty) as an alternative to the mandatory minimums of § 924(c).
• The Court distinguished *Garrett v. United States*, finding that *Garrett* involved a continuing criminal enterprise over several years, whereas this case involves the "classic relation of the lesser included offense to the greater offense."
• The Court concluded that independent penalty schemes suggest a "menu, not a buffet," citing *United States v. Batchelder* and *Ball v. United States*.