Does the Mandatory Victims Restitution Act of 1996 (MVRA) impose criminal punishment for the purposes of the Ex Post Facto Clause? This question arises because the petitioner committed his crime before the MVRA's enactment but was sentenced under its provisions. The Court must determine whether the restitution obligation is a criminal penalty or a civil remedy.

• Sought to void his continued restitution obligation by invoking the Ex Post Facto Clause.
• Argued that restitution under the MVRA constitutes criminal punishment.
• Contended that applying the MVRA to a crime committed before the Act's enactment violates the constitutional prohibition against retroactive penal laws.

• Sought vacatur of the lower court's judgment, although the United States eventually agreed with the petitioner that the Eighth Circuit erred.
• Through the appointed amicus curiae, argued that the MVRA is a civil remedy because it seeks to compensate crime victims, which is a nonpunitive goal.
• Relied on *Smith v. Doe* to argue that the restitution scheme is civil rather than criminal.
• Pointed to the fact that victims receive notice of and are consulted during sentencing proceedings as evidence of the Act's civil nature.

• Restitution under the MVRA is criminal punishment for purposes of the Ex Post Facto Clause.
• The Court applied a test of "statutory construction" that requires the Court to "consider the statute's text and its structure" per *Smith v. Doe*.
• The Court found that the MVRA explicitly labels restitution as a "penalty" for a criminal "offense" under 18 U.S.C. § 3663A(a)(1).
• The Court noted that restitution is imposed only on a criminal "defendant" after conviction, is ordered during "sentencing," and involves the Government, rather than the victim, as the adverse party.
• The Court highlighted that the MVRA is codified in Title 18 ("Crimes and Criminal Procedure"), specifically Chapter 232 ("Miscellaneous Sentencing Provisions"), and requires district courts to follow the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure under § 3664(c).
• The Court observed that restitution can be imposed "in lieu of" other punishments and that failure to pay can result in imprisonment under §§ 3614(b)(2) and 3613A(a)(1).
• The Court relied on *Manrique v. United States*, *Pasquantino v. United States*, and *Paroline v. United States*, which treat MVRA restitution as part of a criminal sentence designed to "mete out appropriate criminal punishment."
• The Court distinguished the MVRA from the civil registration mandate in *Smith v. Doe* because the MVRA lacks "distinctly civil procedures" and is instead integrated into the criminal code.
• The Court concluded that while the MVRA also seeks to compensate victims, the fact that Congress intended to "impose punishment" ends the inquiry under the *Smith* framework.