Did the state appellate court's determination that an undisclosed forensic report was not material under *Brady v. Maryland* violate federal law? Specifically, was that decision "contrary to" or an "unreasonable application" of "clearly established Federal law" as defined by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA)? Did the Fourth Circuit err in granting federal habeas relief by failing to apply the deferential standards required by 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)?

• The state appellate court correctly applied the materiality standard from *Brady v. Maryland* and the "reasonable probability" test.
• The Fourth Circuit failed to adhere to the strict deferential standards mandated by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA).
• The undisclosed forensic report was immaterial because the remaining evidence against the respondent—including DNA and motive—was so strong that there was no reasonable probability the trial outcome would have changed.
• The Fourth Circuit improperly imposed mandatory opinion-writing standards on the state court by criticizing the "nuance" and depth of the state court's analysis.

• The State violated his right to due process by failing to disclose a forensic report that could have discredited a key witness's testimony regarding his research into silencers.
• The forensic report showed a laptop had not been used since 2005 and contained no searches for "silencer," which directly contradicted the testimony of Sheri Carter.
• The state appellate court's decision was an unreasonable application of federal law because it effectively used a sufficiency-of-the-evidence rule rather than the *Brady* materiality test.
• No fairminded jurist could conclude that the undisclosed report was immaterial given the impact it would have had on the prosecution's case.

• The Court held that the state appellate court's decision was neither "contrary to" nor an "unreasonable application" of "clearly established Federal law" under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1).
• The Court emphasized that under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), federal courts must give the "benefit of the doubt" to state court merits decisions, citing *Woodford v. Visciotti*.
• The Court noted that federal courts have "no authority to impose mandatory opinion-writing standards on state courts" per *Johnson v. Williams* and *Miller-El v. Cockrell*.
• Regarding *Brady* materiality, the Court applied the test from *Strickler v. Greene*, stating evidence is material if it could reasonably "put the whole case in such a different light as to undermine confidence in the verdict."
• The Court found the state court correctly applied the *Brady* rule rather than the "sufficiency-of-the-evidence rule" condemned in *Kyles v. Whitley*.
• The Court reasoned that a "fairminded jurist" could find the report immaterial because strong evidence remained, including DNA linking the respondent to the Gatorade bottle, a strong motive, and ownership of a .380-caliber handgun.
• The Court rejected the Fourth Circuit's theory that the bottle was likely a marijuana bong, noting the lack of burnt marijuana smell and the presence of a bullet-like hole.
• The Court concluded that the Fourth Circuit's grant of habeas relief was an "extreme malfunction" in the application of AEDPA's deferential standards as described in *Harrington v. Richter*.