Learning Resources, Inc. et al. v. Trump, President of the United States, et al.
No. 24-1287 · Decided February 20, 2026 · affirmed
Does the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA) authorize the President to impose tariffs? IEEPA does not authorize the President to impose tariffs.
CERTIORARI BEFORE JUDGMENT TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT · Argued November 5, 2025
Parties — Petitioner: LEARNING RESOURCES, INC., et al. · Respondent: TRUMP, PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES, et al.
Vote & lineup6–3 on the judgment. Roberts announced the judgment of the Court, joined by Sotomayor, Kagan, Gorsuch, Barrett, Jackson (6). Dissent(s): Thomas; Kavanaugh (joined by Thomas, Alito). Concurrence(s): Gorsuch, Barrett; Kagan (joined by Sotomayor, Jackson); Jackson.
Who prevailed — The petitioners (and respondents in *V.O.S. Selections*) prevailed in that the Court held the President lacks the authority under IEEPA to impose the challenged tariffs.
The question

Does the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA) authorize the President to impose tariffs? This question arises from the President's imposition of duties to address illegal drug influxes and trade deficits. The Court must determine if the statutory authority to "regulate... importation" includes the power to levy taxes.

Petitioner's argument
  • IEEPA does not grant the President the power to impose tariffs.
  • The power to tax is a core congressional power vested exclusively in the Legislative Branch under Article I, Section 8, of the Constitution.
  • The statutory authority to "regulate... importation" is not a delegation of the power to tax.
Respondent's argument
  • IEEPA's grant of authority to "regulate... importation" constitutes a sweeping delegation of Congress's power to set tariff policy.
  • Tariffs are a traditional and common tool used to regulate importation.
  • Precedents such as *Federal Energy Administration v. Algonquin SNG, Inc.* and the Nixon-era tariffs support the reading that "regulate" encompasses the power to impose duties.
The decision
  • IEEPA does not authorize the President to impose tariffs.
  • The Court relies on Article I, Section 8, of the Constitution, which specifies that "The Congress shall have Power To lay and collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts and Excises," a power the Framers did not vest in the Executive Branch.
  • Applying the "major questions doctrine," the Court reasons that because the asserted power to impose unbounded tariffs is of "major economic and political significance," the President must point to "clear congressional authorization" (*West Virginia v. EPA*; *Biden v. Nebraska*).
  • The Court finds no such clear authorization in IEEPA § 1702(a)(1)(B), which allows the President to "regulate... importation"; citing *Black's Law Dictionary*, the Court concludes that "regulate" does not ordinarily include taxation.
  • The Court notes that when Congress delegates tariff powers, it does so in explicit terms using words like "duty" or "surcharge" and subjects them to strict limits (e.g., 19 U.S.C. § 1338(d), § 2132(a)).
  • The Court observes a lack of historical precedent, noting that in IEEPA's half-century of existence, no President had invoked the statute to impose tariffs prior to the current administration.
  • The Court distinguishes *Federal Energy Administration v. Algonquin SNG, Inc.*, reasoning that the statute in that case contained sweeping discretion-conferring language and explicit references to duties that IEEPA lacks.
  • The Court concludes that a reading of "regulate" that includes taxation would render IEEPA partly unconstitutional, as taxing exports is expressly forbidden by Art. I, § 9, cl. 5.
Separate opinions
Gorsuch, concurring
  • Argues that the major questions doctrine is rooted in long-standing common law and agency law clear-statement rules regarding "extraordinary power."
  • Cites *Kirk v. Nowill* and *In re Election of Directors of Long Island R. Co.* to demonstrate that extraordinary authority must be expressly granted by the progenitor.
Barrett, concurring
  • Argues that the major questions doctrine is not a separate substantive canon but an application of textualism that "situates text in context."
  • Contends that "common sense" and "constitutional structure" are tools used to ascertain a text's "most natural meaning."
Kagan, concurring (joined by Sotomayor, Jackson)
  • Agrees that IEEPA does not authorize tariffs but rejects the use of the major questions doctrine.
  • Argues that ordinary tools of statutory interpretation—examining text in context and congressional practice—amply support the result without needing a special "clear authorization" rule.
Jackson, concurring
  • Argues that the Court should consult legislative history to determine congressional intent.
  • Cites House and Senate Reports accompanying IEEPA and its predecessor, the Trading with the Enemy Act (TWEA), to show Congress intended the statute to authorize "freezing control" of property, not taxation.
Thomas, dissenting
  • Argues that the nondelegation doctrine does not apply here because importing is a "privilege" rather than a "right" to life, liberty, or property.
  • Cites *Association of American Railroads* to argue that core legislative power only involves rules setting conditions for the deprivation of core private rights.
Kavanaugh, dissenting (joined by Thomas, Alito)
  • Argues that "regulate... importation" encompasses tariffs based on dictionary definitions, historical practice (e.g., Nixon and Ford tariffs), and *Federal Energy Administration v. Algonquin SNG, Inc.*
  • Contends that the major questions doctrine should not apply to foreign affairs, citing *United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp.* and *Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer*.
Read the full opinion on supremecourt.gov (PDF) →