Does the postal exception of the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) bar lawsuits based on the intentional nondelivery of mail? Specifically, the Court must determine if the terms "loss" and "miscarriage" in 28 U. S. C. §2680(b) encompass intentional acts by postal employees. The decision resolves a split between the Fifth Circuit and the First and Second Circuits.

• The postal exception in 28 U. S. C. §2680(b) is intended to protect the government from burdensome tort suits arising from the Postal Service's core function of transporting mail.
• The terms "loss" and "miscarriage" should be interpreted according to their ordinary meanings at the time of the FTCA's enactment in 1946.
• These terms describe the resulting harm—the failure of mail to arrive—rather than the specific intent or action of the postal worker.
• The "negligent" qualifier in the statute applies only to "transmission" and does not limit the scope of "loss" or "miscarriage."

• The postal exception does not apply to intentional misconduct, as "loss" and "miscarriage" typically refer to unintentional or inadvertent failures.
• The inclusion of the word "negligent" before "transmission" indicates that Congress intended the exception to cover only negligent, not intentional, conduct.
• Interpreting "loss" and "miscarriage" to include intentional acts would create redundant, overlapping definitions that violate the presumption against surplusage.
• The exception should be narrowly construed to avoid defeating the FTCA's central purpose of waiving sovereign immunity.

• The Court held that the United States retains sovereign immunity for claims arising from the intentional nondelivery of mail under 28 U. S. C. §2680(b).
• The Court applied the test of "ordinary meaning" at the time of enactment (1946), citing *Wisconsin Central Ltd. v. United States*.
• Regarding "miscarriage," the Court relied on the *2 New Century Dictionary of the English Language*, *Oxford English Dictionary*, and *Webster’s New International Dictionary* to conclude the term means any "failure of a letter... to reach its destination," regardless of intent.
• Regarding "loss," the Court found it means "deprivation of mail," citing *Black’s Law Dictionary* and *Webster’s Second*, noting that deprivation can occur through intentional acts like theft.
• The Court reasoned that "loss" in §2680(b) is consistent with the use of "loss of property" in the FTCA's principal provision, 28 U. S. C. §1346(b)(1), which includes losses caused by intentional misconduct.
• The Court rejected the argument that "negligent" modifies "loss" or "miscarriage," citing *Barnhart v. Thomas* to hold that an adjective before the final noun in a list cannot be transplanted to qualify preceding nouns.
• The Court dismissed the surplusage argument, citing *Dolan v. Postal Service* and the "cardinal canon" from *Connecticut Nat. Bank v. Germain* that a legislature says in a statute what it means, even if terms overlap.
• The Court concluded that the exception focuses on "kinds of harms" (the failure of mail to arrive) rather than "kinds of actions" by postal workers.