Does a trial court's order prohibiting a defendant and their counsel from discussing the defendant's ongoing testimony during an overnight recess violate the Sixth Amendment? Specifically, the Court considers whether such a "qualified conferral order" is permissible when other topics of discussion remain allowed. The issue is whether the distinction between a total ban and a content-specific ban depends on the length of the recess or the nature of the communication.

• The distinction between a brief daytime recess and an overnight recess is temporal.
• During an overnight recess, the Sixth Amendment right to confer with counsel is absolute and unqualified.
• Any restriction on discussing testimony will inevitably "chill" protected discussions on other legal or tactical matters.
• A bright-line rule should prohibit all restrictions on counsel-client consultation during overnight recesses.

• The distinction between *Geders v. United States* and *Perry v. Leeke* is substantive (content-based) rather than temporal.
• The Sixth Amendment does not protect a defendant's right to discuss their own ongoing testimony with counsel.
• A court may prohibit the discussion of "unprotected content" (testimony for its own sake) while still allowing consultation on protected topics.
• The trial court's order to avoid "managing" testimony is a permissible exercise of discretion to preserve the truth-seeking function of the trial.

• The Court held that a qualified conferral order prohibiting only the discussion of a defendant's testimony for its own sake during a mid-testimony overnight recess is constitutional.
• The Court relied on the Sixth Amendment's guarantee of the right to consult counsel (*Powell v. Alabama*), but noted that a defendant who testifies "[a]ssum[es] the position of a witness" (*Reagan v. United States*).
• The Court distinguished *Geders v. United States* (which banned total overnight conferral) and *Perry v. Leeke* (which allowed total brief daytime bans), concluding the difference is "substantive, not merely temporal."
• The Court established that while defendants have a right to discuss "tactical decisions," "strategies," and "plea bargain[ing]" (*Perry*), they have no constitutional right to discuss "nothing but the testimony" while on the stand.
• The Court reasoned that prohibiting "testimony qua testimony" mimics the traditional practice of witness sequestration to prevent "chameleonic adjustments" and advance the "central truth-seeking function of the trial" (*Portuondo v. Agard*).
• The Court found the trial judge's order against "managing" ongoing testimony permissibly balanced the truth-seeking function against the right to discuss protected topics.
• The Court clarified that a court cannot prohibit advice on protected topics (e.g., a guilty plea) even if the "why" involves the impact of ongoing testimony.
• The Court rejected the request for a bright-line rule prohibiting all overnight restrictions, finding that lawyers can distinguish between "testimony for its own sake" and other protected consultation.