Does an Internet service provider incur contributory copyright liability under the Copyright Act by continuing to provide service to subscribers whose IP addresses are known to be associated with infringement? Specifically, is mere knowledge of infringement, combined with a failure to terminate service, sufficient to establish the requisite intent for contributory liability? Does the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA) safe harbor imply that providers are otherwise liable for serving known infringers?

• Cox did not induce infringement; rather, it actively discouraged it by sending warnings, suspending services, and terminating accounts.
• Internet access is a general-purpose service "capable of substantial noninfringing uses" and is not tailored to infringement.
• Under Supreme Court precedent, mere knowledge that a service will be used to infringe is insufficient to establish the intent required for contributory liability.
• The DMCA safe harbor provides a defense but does not expressly create a new basis for liability for ISPs who serve known infringers.

• Cox contributed to infringement by continuing to provide Internet service to subscribers whose IP addresses Cox knew were associated with infringement.
• The Fourth Circuit correctly held that supplying a product with knowledge that the recipient will use it to infringe copyrights is sufficient for contributory infringement.
• The DMCA safe harbor—which requires the termination of "repeat infringers" under 17 U.S.C. § 512(i)(1)(A)—would be meaningless if ISPs were not otherwise liable for serving known infringers.
• Not stated.

• The Court held that a service provider is contributorily liable for a user's infringement only if it intended the service be used for infringement.
• Intent can be established in only two ways: if the party affirmatively induced the infringement or if the provided service is tailored to that infringement.
• Inducement requires that a party "actively encourages infringement through specific acts," as seen in *Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd.*
• A service is tailored to infringement if it is "not capable of 'substantial' or 'commercially significant' noninfringing uses," a test established in *Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc.*
• The Court emphasized that "mere knowledge that a service will be used to infringe is insufficient" to establish intent, citing *Kalem Co. v. Harper Brothers*, *Sony*, and *Grokster*.
• Cox did not induce infringement because it did not promote it and instead discouraged it through warnings and terminations.
• Cox's service was not tailored to infringement because general Internet access is capable of substantial noninfringing uses.
• The Court rejected the Fourth Circuit's reasoning that supplying a product with knowledge of its infringing use is sufficient for liability, noting this expanded liability beyond precedent.
• Regarding the DMCA, the Court noted that 17 U.S.C. § 512(l) specifies that failure to comply with safe-harbor rules "shall not bear adversely upon... a defense... that the service provider's conduct is not infringing."