Does the Sentencing Reform Act authorize a rule that automatically extends a defendant's term of supervised release when the defendant absconds? Specifically, does such abscondment "toll" the clock of a judicially ordered term so that subsequent crimes can be treated as supervised release violations? This question arises from a circuit split regarding whether a defendant's failure to report extends their period of supervision beyond the court's original order.

• The district court lacked lawful authority to treat the January 2022 state drug offense as an independent supervised release violation.
• The offense in question occurred after her pre-existing term of federal supervised release had already expired in June 2021.
• Abscondment does not automatically extend a term of supervised release under the statutory framework.

• Because supervision requires "observation and direction" under 18 U.S.C. §§ 3601, 3624(e), and 3603(2), (3), the petitioner should receive no "credit" for the period she spent absconding.
• Common-law principles, as illustrated in *Anderson v. Corall*, 263 U.S. 193 (1923), suggest that time spent on the run from authorities should not count toward the discharge of a sentence.
• Precedents such as *Mont v. United States*, 587 U.S. 514, and *United States v. Johnson*, 529 U.S. 53, support the adoption of the Ninth Circuit's rule.
• The warrant-or-summons requirement in 18 U.S.C. § 3583(i) may leave courts powerless to address violations if probation officers do not realize a defendant is absent in time.

• The Court held that the Sentencing Reform Act does not authorize a rule automatically extending a defendant's term of supervised release when the defendant absconds.
• The Court reasoned that 18 U.S.C. § 3624(e), which defines when a term starts, and 18 U.S.C. § 3583(b), which sets maximum lengths, contain no mention of an automatic extension rule.
• The Court noted that the Act already provides potent tools for addressing absconders, including the authority to revoke release and impose additional imprisonment under 18 U.S.C. §§ 3583(e)(3) and (g).
• The Court found the Ninth Circuit's rule conflicts with 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(2), which requires a hearing for extensions and prohibits extensions beyond statutory maximums or after a term has expired.
• The Court highlighted 18 U.S.C. § 3583(i), which limits post-expiration revocation to "matters arising before its expiration" and requires that a warrant or summons be issued during the term.
• The Court identified 18 U.S.C. § 3624(e) as the only "true tolling rule" in the Act, as it suspends the term only during imprisonment of 30 consecutive days or more.
• The Court rejected the government's reliance on *Mont v. United States*, 587 U.S. 514, and *United States v. Johnson*, 529 U.S. 53, stating that these cases do not support an automatic extension rule.
• The Court distinguished the common-law rule and *Anderson v. Corall*, 263 U.S. 193 (1923), arguing that unlike an escaped prisoner, a defendant on supervised release remains bound by release terms and can be punished for violations without needing to automatically extend the term.