Does a state-court environmental suit challenging Chevron's crude-oil production during the Second World War satisfy the "relating to" requirement of the federal officer removal statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1442(a)(1)? Specifically, the Court must decide if this production relates to Chevron's wartime refining of crude oil into aviation gasoline for the U.S. military. The central issue is whether the connection between the challenged production and the federal refining duties is sufficient to authorize removal to federal court.

• The suit "relat[ed] to" its contractual duties to refine crude oil into aviation gasoline (avgas) for the military during the war.
• The challenged crude-oil production was a necessary precursor to the refining process required by its federal contracts.
• The production activities targeted by the parish were closely connected to the performance of its federal duties.
• Petitioner sought to remove the suit from state court to federal court.

• The suit did not "relate to" the refining contract because the contract did not specify how Chevron was to acquire or produce crude oil.
• The Government's allocation of crude oil to refineries acted as an intermediary that severed any relation between the production of oil and its refining.
• The removal statute requires that the defendant was "acting under" a federal officer while taking the specific actions challenged in the suit.
• Respondent sought to remand the suit to state court.

• The Court held that Chevron plausibly alleged a close relationship between its challenged crude-oil production and its federal avgas refining duties, satisfying the "relating to" requirement of 28 U.S.C. § 1442(a)(1).
• The Court defined "relating to" broadly as meaning "to stand in some relation; to have bearing or concern; to pertain; refer; to bring into association with or connection with," citing *Morales v. Trans World Airlines, Inc.*
• The Court reasoned that a connection may be "indirect" (*Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. McClendon*), not "specifically designed to affect" the other (*Ingersoll-Rand*), and may exist without a "strict causal relationship" (*Ford Motor Co. v. Montana Eighth Judicial Dist. Court*).
• However, the Court noted that "relating to" is not meaningless and requires a connection that is not "tenuous, remote, or peripheral," citing *Rutledge v. Pharmaceutical Care Management Assn.*
• The Court found a close connection here because crude oil is the "essential feedstock" for avgas, and Chevron's challenged methods (vertical drilling, canals, and earthen pits) were used to maximize production to support the war effort.
• The Court rejected the requirement that a federal contract must expressly direct the challenged conduct for it to "relate to" the performance of federal duties, citing *Ingersoll-Rand* for the principle that a law can relate to a plan even if not specifically designed to affect it.
• The Court held that an act can relate to its consequences even with intermediaries in the causal chain, citing *Morales* to conclude that government allocation of oil did not sever the relation between production and refining.
• The Court rejected the theory that the defendant must be "acting under" a federal officer during the specific challenged acts, ruling that this would impermissibly conflate the "acting under" and "relating to" elements of 28 U.S.C. § 1442(a)(1) and render the latter redundant, citing *National Assn. of Home Builders v. Defenders of Wildlife*.