District of Columbia v. R. W.
No. 25-248 · Decided April 20, 2026 · reversed and remanded
Did the police officer have reasonable suspicion to stop R. W. under the Fourth Amendment? The Court held that the police officer had reasonable suspicion to stop R. W. based on the totality of the circumstances, including the radio dispatch, the flight of the passengers, and the driver's attempt to reverse the vehicle.
Vote & lineupPer Curiam
The question
Did the police officer have reasonable suspicion to stop R. W. under the Fourth Amendment? The Court specifically considers whether the totality of the circumstances, including a radio dispatch and the behavior of the driver and passengers, justified the stop. Additionally, the Court addresses whether the lower court erred by "excising" certain facts from its reasonable suspicion analysis.
Petitioner's argument
- The officer had reasonable suspicion to stop R. W. based on the totality of the circumstances.
- The lower court erred by evaluating and rejecting specific factors in isolation rather than considering the "whole picture."
- The combined facts—the radio dispatch, the flight of the passengers, and the driver's attempt to reverse—suggested criminal activity.
Respondent's argument
- Officer Vanterpool lacked reasonable articulable suspicion sufficient to justify the seizure.
- The facts remaining after the lower court's analysis—the late hour and the slight movement of the car—did not independently give rise to reasonable suspicion.
- The stop violated the Fourth Amendment.
The decision
- The Court held that Officer Vanterpool had reasonable suspicion to stop R. W., reversing the judgment of the District of Columbia Court of Appeals.
- The Court noted that for a brief investigatory stop, the Fourth Amendment "is satisfied if the officer's action is supported by reasonable suspicion to believe that criminal activity 'may be afoot,'" citing *United States v. Arvizu* and *United States v. Sokolow*.
- The Court applied the "totality of the circumstances" test, which "precludes the 'evaluation and rejection' of 'factors in isolation from each other,'" citing *United States v. Arvizu*.
- The Court reasoned that reasonable suspicion "depends on the factual and practical considerations of everyday life on which reasonable and prudent men, not legal technicians, act," citing *Kansas v. Glover* and *Prado Navarette v. California*.
- The Court found that "unprovoked flight upon noticing the police . . . is certainly suggestive" of wrongdoing, citing *Illinois v. Wardlow*.
- The Court determined that R. W.'s attempt to reverse the car while a door remained open, combined with the flight of his companions, strongly suggested unlawful conduct, citing *Sibron v. New York* regarding "deliberately furtive actions" as "strong indicia of mens rea."
- The Court emphasized that reasonable suspicion "need not rule out the possibility of innocent conduct," citing *Prado Navarette v. California* and *United States v. Arvizu*.
- The Court concluded that the lower court's "divide-and-conquer analysis" of "excising" the radio dispatch and the passengers' flight was incompatible with the requirement to consider "the whole picture," citing *District of Columbia v. Wesby* and *United States v. Cortez*.
Separate opinions
SOTOMAYOR, concurring in the judgment, joined by nobody
- Justice Sotomayor would have denied the petition for a writ of certiorari.
JACKSON, dissenting, joined by nobody
- Argues that the lower court's factor-by-factor analysis is standard judicial practice and that "excising" facts is a matter of word choice rather than a methodological error.
- Contends that the radio dispatch call was rightly ignored because an officer may not rely on the "unsupported hunch of a fellow officer," citing *Whiteley v. Warden* and *United States v. Hensley*.
- Asserts that the case is a "factbound determination" that does not warrant the use of the Court's summary discretion.