Does federal law preempt a state-law tort suit against a military contractor for activities performed in a war zone? Specifically, does such preemption apply even when the contractor's challenged conduct was not authorized or required by the Federal Government? The case asks whether the "battlefield preemption" doctrine applied by the Fourth Circuit is supported by the Constitution or federal statutes.

• The Federal Tort Claims Act's combatant-activities exception does not apply to private contractors.
• Preemption under *Boyle v. United Technologies Corp.* is inapplicable because the government did not direct the specific negligent conduct at issue.
• The contractor's failure to supervise the employee violated military instructions, meaning there is no "significant conflict" between federal policy and state law.
• No constitutional provision or federal statute expressly bars a suit for negligence in this context.

• During wartime, all state-law claims against military contractors integrated into combatant activities under military command are preempted.
• The Federal Tort Claims Act's combatant-activities exception reflects a congressional intent to bar tort suits against contractors connected with those activities.
• The Constitution's structure implicitly preempts suits that interfere with the Federal Government's exclusive war powers.
• Allowing the suit would force courts to evaluate sensitive military decisions and potentially apply foreign law.

• The Court held that the Fourth Circuit erred in finding the state-law tort claims preempted because the Federal Government neither ordered nor authorized the challenged conduct.
• Under the Supremacy Clause (Art. VI, cl. 2), state law yields only when it conflicts with the Constitution, a valid federal statute, or a treaty.
• The Court found no express preemption, noting that the Federal Tort Claims Act's combatant-activities exception (28 U. S. C. §2680(j)) does not apply to suits against federal contractors per *United States v. Orleans*.
• Applying *Boyle v. United Technologies Corp.*, the Court reasoned that preemption in areas of "uniquely federal interest" requires a "significant conflict" between an identifiable federal policy and the operation of state law.
• *Boyle* only protects a contractor when the Government directed the contractor to do the "very thing challenged in the suit," which is not the case here as the respondent allegedly violated military instructions.
• The Court rejected the *Yearsley v. W. A. Ross Constr. Co.* defense because that doctrine only shields contractors who are "accomplishing what the Federal Government requested."
• Regarding constitutional structure, the Court noted that war powers (Art. I, § 8, cls. 11–13; Art. II, § 2, cl. 1) do not bar all war-related tort suits, citing *Little v. Barreme* and *Mitchell v. Harmony*.
• The Court relied on *Penn Dairies, Inc. v. Milk Control Comm'n of Pa.* to affirm that States can regulate federal contractors on the same terms as private companies absent a contrary statute.