Whether the 30-day deadline for removing a civil action from state to federal court under 28 U. S. C. § 1446(b)(1) is subject to equitable tolling. The Court must determine if the nonjurisdictional nature of this deadline automatically renders it susceptible to equitable exceptions. Specifically, the case asks if the text, structure, and context of the removal statutes rebut the presumption that such a time limit can be equitably extended.

• Sought to have the removal deadline equitably tolled to excuse their removal of the case 887 days after service.
• Argued that because § 1446(b)(1) is nonjurisdictional, it is presumptively subject to equitable tolling.
• Contended that the presumption of equitable tolling can only be rebutted by the "clearest command" from Congress.
• Asserted that the 30-day deadline focuses on litigant conduct rather than court authority, making it akin to other provisions the Court has held subject to tolling.

• Sought to remand the case to Michigan state court on the basis that the removal was untimely.
• Argued that § 1446(b)(1) is not a statute of limitations because it addresses a forum issue rather than extinguishing a claim, meaning no presumption of equitable tolling applies.
• Contended that even if a presumption of equitable tolling exists, it is rebutted by the text, structure, and context of § 1446(b)(1).

• Held that § 1446(b)(1) is not subject to equitable tolling because its text, structure, and context are inconsistent with such a doctrine.
• Clarified that while jurisdictional requirements cannot be equitably excepted (*Boechler v. Commissioner*), the fact that a deadline is nonjurisdictional does not automatically make it "malleable in every respect" (*Nutraceutical Corp. v. Lambert*).
• Applied the test from *Arellano v. McDonough*, finding that the presumption of equitable tolling is rebutted if there is "good reason to believe that Congress did not want the equitable tolling doctrine to apply."
• Reasoned that the "explicit listing of exceptions" in the statute strongly indicates Congress did not intend for courts to read in open-ended "equitable" exceptions (*United States v. Brockamp*).
• Noted that § 1446(b)(3) (the discovery rule) and § 1446(c)(1) (the "bad faith" exception) already incorporate equitable considerations, making broader tolling superfluous.
• Pointed to other statutes—§ 1441(d), § 1454(b)(2), and § 1441(e)(1)—which explicitly allow the § 1446(b) limit to be enlarged "for cause shown," proving that Congress provides equitable relief only where specifically authorized.
• Contrasted civil removal with criminal removal under § 1455(b)(1), which expressly allows late filing for "good cause shown," whereas the civil statutes omit such a general power.
• Invoked the "nature of the subject matter," citing a "general interest in avoiding prolonged litigation on threshold nonmerits questions" (*Powerex Corp. v. Reliant Energy Services, Inc.*) and an "obvious concern with efficiency" (*BP p.l.c. v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore*).