Does a federal court that has previously stayed claims in a pending action under § 3 of the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) have jurisdiction to confirm or vacate a resulting arbitral award on those claims? This applies even when the motion to confirm under § 9 or the motion to vacate under § 10 does not independently present a basis for federal jurisdiction on its face. The core issue is whether the court retains its original jurisdiction throughout the arbitration process.

• Sought to vacate the arbitral award and prevent its confirmation in federal court.
• Argued that *Badgerow v. Walters* requires an independent jurisdictional basis for all § 9 and § 10 motions, regardless of whether a prior suit existed.
• Contended that § 9 and § 10 applications should be treated as "new federal actions" because the FAA requires service and notice for such applications.
• Asserted that FAA § 8's specific jurisdictional language for maritime arbitrations proves that Congress intentionally omitted a "jurisdictional anchor" for general § 9 and § 10 motions.

• Sought to confirm the arbitral award as a judgment of the court.
• Argued that the District Court already possessed original jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 over the original claims.
• Contended that the court does not need to "look through" the FAA motions to find jurisdiction because the suit is already pending before the court.
• Asserted that the FAA's requirement for a stay under § 3 (rather than dismissal) is intended to allow the court to maintain a supervisory role over the arbitration.

• The Court held that a federal court that stayed claims under § 3 of the FAA retains jurisdiction to confirm or vacate the resulting award under § 9 and § 10.
• The Court reasoned that unlike "freestanding" applications in *Vaden v. Discover Bank* and *Badgerow v. Walters*, this case does not require "looking through" a motion to a controversy outside the court.
• Instead, the court assesses jurisdiction by looking at the suit already before it; since the District Court had original jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331, it retains "jurisdiction to decide the case" and thus "jurisdiction to decide [the] motion," as established in *Badgerow*.
• The Court noted that *Hall Street Associates, L.L.C. v. Mattel, Inc.* confirms the FAA "does nothing" to eliminate jurisdiction over controversies touching arbitration.
• The Court rejected the idea that an arbitral award acts as a total release that destroys jurisdiction, noting in *Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of America* that courts may embody private settlements in their orders.
• The Court relied on *Smith v. Spizzirri* to emphasize that the mandatory stay in § 3 "comports with the supervisory role that the FAA envisions for the courts," including "facilitating recovery on an arbitral award."
• The Court distinguished *Badgerow* by noting that in that case, the only thing before the court was the § 9/10 motion, whereas here the original federal claims provided the jurisdictional basis.
• The Court concluded that the FAA's structure is designed to avoid the "costs and complications" of bringing a new suit, as stated in *Smith v. Spizzirri*.