Havana Docks Corp. v. Royal Caribbean Cruises, LTD., et al.
No. 24-983 · Decided May 21, 2026 · vacated and remanded
Does the phrase "property which was confiscated" in Title III of the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act refer only to the specific property interest held by the plaintiff, or can it refer to the underlying physical property? The Court held that "property which was confiscated" under Title III of the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act can refer to the underlying physical property in which a plaintiff had an interest, meaning a defendant can be liable for trafficking in that physical property even if the plaintiff's specific property interest had already expired.
CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT · Argued February 23, 2026
Parties — Petitioner: HAVANA DOCKS CORP. · Respondent: ROYAL CARIBBEAN CRUISES, LTD., et al.
Vote & lineup8–1 on the judgment. Thomas delivered the opinion of the Court, joined by Roberts, Alito, Sotomayor, Gorsuch, Kavanaugh, Barrett, Jackson (8). Dissent(s): Kagan. Concurrence(s): Sotomayor (joined by Kavanaugh).
Who prevailed — The petitioner, Havana Docks Corporation, prevailed on the issue of whether the cruise lines' use of the docks constituted trafficking in confiscated property.
The question

Does the phrase "property which was confiscated" in Title III of the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act refer only to the specific property interest held by the plaintiff, or can it refer to the underlying physical property? Specifically, the Court must determine if a defendant is liable for trafficking in physical property even if the plaintiff's time-limited interest in that property would have expired before the alleged trafficking occurred. The case asks whether the use of docks by cruise lines constitutes trafficking in confiscated property despite the expiration of the petitioner's usufructuary concession in 2004.

Petitioner's argument
  • The Act imposes liability for trafficking in underlying physical property, not just intangible property interests.
  • The cruise lines used the physical docks, which were "property which was confiscated" when the Cuban Government seized control of them in 1960.
  • The statutory definition of "property" under § 6023(12)(A) explicitly includes "real" and "personal" property, which encompasses physical things.
  • The cruise lines' use of the docks without authorization constitutes "trafficking" under § 6023(13)(A).
Respondent's argument
  • There must be a "one-to-one correspondence" between the property interest confiscated and the property interest trafficked.
  • The Cuban Government did not confiscate the physical docks (which it already owned), but only the time-limited usufructuary concession.
  • Because the concession expired in 2004, the cruise lines could not have trafficked in that interest between 2016 and 2019.
  • The cruise lines' conduct did not interfere with a property interest that would have existed had there been no confiscation.
The decision
  • The Court held that the cruise lines' use of the docks is sufficient to establish they used "property which was confiscated by the Cuban Government" under 22 U.S.C. § 6082(a)(1)(A).
  • The Court reasoned that the plain text of Title III allows "property which was confiscated" to refer to physical property, not just the interest in that property.
  • The Court relied on the definition of "property" in § 6023(12)(A), which includes "real, personal, or mixed" property, and the definition of "confiscated" in § 6023(4)(A), which includes the seizure of "control of property."
  • The Court invoked *Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino*, 376 U.S. 398, noting that "property" can refer to physical things (such as "sugar itself") as well as contractual rights.
  • The Court rejected the Eleventh Circuit's "counterfactual analysis," which assumed no expropriation had occurred to see if the conduct would have interfered with the interest.
  • The Court found that the docks were "tainted" as confiscated property the moment the Cuban Government seized control of them in 1960.
  • The Court concluded that the cruise lines "trafficked" in this property by "using" it or "engaging in a commercial activity using" it without authorization, per § 6023(13)(A)(i) and (ii).
  • The Court determined that Havana Docks' Commission-certified claim serves as "conclusive proof" that it is a United States national who owns the claim to the property under § 6083(a)(1).
Separate opinions
Sotomayor, concurring (joined by Kavanaugh)
  • Argues that the majority's reading could lead to "infinite recoveries" from any person using the docks, potentially violating the Due Process Clause as discussed in *St. Louis, I. M. & S. R. Co. v. Williams*, 251 U.S. 63.
  • Notes a significant question regarding whether the cruise lines' conduct falls under the "lawful travel to Cuba" exception in § 6023(13)(B)(iii).
Kagan, dissenting
  • Argues that the docks were not "confiscated" because the Cuban Government already owned them; only the intangible usufructuary concession was confiscated.
  • Contends that liability under § 6082(a)(1)(A) requires trafficking in the actual property confiscated (the concession), and since that concession expired in 2004, no trafficking occurred in 2016-2019.
  • Relies on *Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency*, 535 U.S. 302, to argue that property interests are defined by both spatial and temporal boundaries.
Read the full opinion on supremecourt.gov (PDF) →