Margolin, Director of the Executive Office for Immigration Review v. National Association of Immigration Judges
No. 25-767 · Decided May 26, 2026 · reversed and remanded
Did the Fourth Circuit violate the party-presentation principle by deciding a case on a question broader than the one advanced by the parties? The Fourth Circuit violated the party-presentation principle and abused its discretion by deciding the case on a broad issue regarding the functioning of the Civil Service Reform Act of 1978 that was not raised by either party.
Vote & lineupPer Curiam
The question
Did the Fourth Circuit violate the party-presentation principle by deciding a case on a question broader than the one advanced by the parties? Specifically, did the court err by remanding for factfinding into whether the Civil Service Reform Act of 1978 was "functioning as Congress intended" when the parties only argued whether specific claims were covered by the Act? Whether this departure from the rule that points not argued will not be considered constitutes an abuse of discretion.
Petitioner's argument
- The Fourth Circuit violated the party-presentation principle by deciding the case on a novel ground that neither party had raised.
- The court failed to provide either side an opportunity to address the theory that the Civil Service Reform Act of 1978 (CSRA) might not be functioning as intended.
- The court's decision to act *sua sponte* on a broad issue constituted a "drastic" departure from the adversarial system and an abuse of discretion.
Respondent's argument
- The specific First and Fifth Amendment claims of its members were not the kind of work-related claims that Congress intended to steer out of district court under the CSRA.
- While the CSRA generally channels judicial review of covered employment actions to the Merit Systems Protection Board (MSPB), these specific claims fell outside that scheme.
- Respondent sought to have its constitutional challenges heard in federal district court rather than through the administrative review process.
The decision
- The Court held that the Fourth Circuit violated the party-presentation principle, which is the "rule that points not argued will not be considered."
- Relying on *United States v. Burke*, the Court explained that this principle distinguishes the United States' adversarial system of justice from an inquisitorial one.
- The Court noted that federal courts are "essentially passive instruments of government" and must rely on the parties to "frame the issues for decision," citing *United States v. Sineneng-Smith*.
- The Court found that the parties had confined their arguments to the narrow question of whether the respondent's claims were "covered" by the Civil Service Reform Act of 1978 (CSRA), 92 Stat. 1122, 1125, 5 U. S. C. §§ 1205, 1206.
- The Fourth Circuit erred by *sua sponte* transforming the argument into a broader question of whether the CSRA "might not—in light of current conditions—channel any claims."
- Citing *Clark v. Sweeney*, the Court concluded that granting relief based on a claim that a party "never asserted and that the State never had the chance to address" is a "drastic" departure from the party-presentation principle.
- The Court determined that this departure "constituted an abuse of discretion," quoting *United States v. Sineneng-Smith*.
- The Court emphasized that federal courts are not "roving commissions" licensed to "sally forth each day looking for wrongs to right," citing *Broadrick v. Oklahoma* and *United States v. Sineneng-Smith*.
Separate opinions
THOMAS, concurring, joined by BARRETT
- Argues the Fourth Circuit was wrong on the merits because the CSRA, 5 U. S. C. § 1101 et seq., and *Elgin v. Department of Treasury* require covered employees to proceed exclusively through the statutory review scheme.
- Contends that the meaning of a statute does not change based on "political considerations" or the President's removal of officials, citing *United States ex rel. Marcus v. Hess* and *Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida*.
- Asserts that statutes change only via Congress, not via judicial decisions on whether they vindicate purposes, citing U. S. Const., Art. I, §§ 1, 7.