Does a worker qualify for the exemption from the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) under 9 U.S.C. § 1 if they never cross state lines? Specifically, does the exemption apply if the worker also never interacts with vehicles that cross state lines? The Court must determine if such a worker is "engaged in... interstate commerce" within the meaning of the statute.

• Sought to compel arbitration of the dispute based on a signed distribution agreement.
• Argued that to be "engaged in interstate commerce" under 9 U.S.C. § 1, a worker must either cross state lines or interact with a vehicle that does.
• Contended that the statutory text supports a bright-line rule excluding workers who neither cross borders nor "tag" vehicles that cross borders.
• Suggested that other factors, such as the respondent's ownership of an independent company and his taking title to the goods, should disqualify him from the exemption.

• Sought to avoid compelled arbitration and maintain the right to litigate in federal court.
• Argued that his intrastate delivery route formed a "constituent part" of the interstate journey of the goods from out-of-state bakeries to retail stores.
• Maintained that he belonged to a class of workers engaged in interstate commerce despite not crossing state lines or interacting with vehicles that did.
• Not stated.

• The Court held that a worker who transports goods on an intrastate leg of an interstate journey can qualify for the 9 U.S.C. § 1 exemption without crossing state lines or interacting with vehicles that do.
• The Court analyzed the statutory text of 9 U.S.C. § 1, which provides that "nothing" in the FAA shall be used to compel arbitration in disputes involving "contracts of employment of seamen, railroad employees, or any other class of workers engaged in foreign or interstate commerce."
• Relying on *Black's Law Dictionary* (3d ed. 1933), the Court defined "engage" as to "take part in," "employ[ed]," or "involve[d]" and "interstate commerce" as the transportation of persons or property "between or among the several states... or from or between points in one state and points in another state."
• The Court reasoned that "interstate commerce" includes intrastate activity if it is part of a "continuous carriage" between states, citing the *Cyclopedic Law Dictionary* (2d ed. 1922).
• The Court invoked *The Daniel Ball*, 10 Wall. 557 (1871), which found a steamer operating entirely within Michigan was "engaged in commerce between the States" because it transported goods destined for other states or brought from without Michigan.
• The Court cited *Rearick v. Pennsylvania*, 203 U. S. 507; *Rhodes v. Iowa*, 170 U. S. 412; and *Norfolk & Western R. Co. v. Pennsylvania*, 136 U. S. 114 as further evidence that intrastate portions of a journey can be part of interstate commerce.
• While acknowledging these cases interpreted the Constitution's Commerce Clause, the Court found them probative of how an ordinary person in 1925 would have understood the terms "engaged in" as used in the FAA.
• The Court reaffirmed the test from *Southwest Airlines Co. v. Saxon*, 596 U. S. 450, that the worker must play a "direct," "necessary," and "active" role in moving goods across borders.
• The Court rejected the petitioner's proposed "bright-line rule" because the statutory text does not support a requirement to cross state lines or interact with vehicles that do.