Did the Mississippi Supreme Court unreasonably apply *Batson v. Kentucky* and the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA) by concluding that the petitioner waived his objection to race-based peremptory strikes? Specifically, did the petitioner waive his right to argue that the prosecutor's race-neutral reasons were pretextual when the trial court failed to conduct the third step of the *Batson* inquiry? Whether the state court's determination of waiver was an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law or an unreasonable unreasonable determination of the facts under 28 U. S. C. §§ 2254(d)(1), (2).

• The trial court failed to conduct the essential third step of the *Batson* inquiry by not allowing defense counsel to rebut the prosecutor's race-neutral reasons as pretextual.
• Defense counsel did not waive the argument because they attempted to raise the issue again at the close of jury selection but were cut off by the trial court.
• The trial court explicitly assured counsel that the objection was preserved, stating: "I think you already made those, and they are clear in the record."
• The Mississippi Supreme Court's finding of waiver was therefore unreasonable under the standards of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996.

• The petitioner preserved a general *Batson* objection but specifically waived the "pretext" argument by failing to argue it during the trial.
• The Mississippi Supreme Court's waiver finding was reasonable under state preservation rules.
• The record does not show that the trial court prevented the defense from making a comparative juror argument.
• Not stated.

• The Court held that the Mississippi Supreme Court unreasonably applied *Batson* precedents and unreasonably determined that the petitioner waived his opportunity to rebut the prosecutor's asserted race-neutral reasons for the peremptory strikes of four black prospective jurors.
• The Court relied on *Batson v. Kentucky*, which establishes that the Equal Protection Clause bars prosecutors from exercising peremptory challenges based on race.
• The Court applied the three-step *Batson* test: (1) a prima facie showing that a strike was based on race; (2) the prosecutor providing a race-neutral reason; and (3) the defendant's opportunity to rebut those reasons as pretextual (*Miller-El v. Dretke*, *Flowers v. Mississippi*, *Snyder v. Louisiana*).
• The Court found that the trial court "full-stop ended its Batson analysis" at step two and never proceeded to step three, failing to determine if the reasons were pretextual.
• While *Ford v. Georgia* establishes the bedrock principle that a party must raise an objection in the trial court to preserve it for appeal, the Court found no waiver here because the trial court explicitly told counsel the objections "are clear in the record."
• The Court rejected the State's argument that the petitioner preserved a *Batson* objection but waived a "pretext argument," noting that after the prosecutor asserts race-neutral reasons, the *Batson* objection *is* a pretext argument.
• The Court noted that a rebuttal necessarily includes arguing that similarly situated white jurors were not challenged (*Flowers v. Mississippi*).
• Under the AEDPA standard (28 U. S. C. §§ 2254(d)(1), (2)), the Court held that while review is deferential to state courts (*Williams v. Taylor*, *Harrington v. Richter*, *Brown v. Davenport*, *Klein v. Martin*), "deference does not mean abdication" (*Miller-El v. Dretke*).