Whether the sentencing disparity created by a nonretroactive change to sentencing law constitutes an "extraordinary and compelling reason" that warrants a sentence reduction. Specifically, the Court addresses whether such a disparity allows a prisoner to be eligible for compassionate release under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i). The case focuses on the impact of the First Step Act of 2018's nonretroactive amendments to 18 U.S.C. § 924(c).

• The terms "extraordinary and compelling" are flexible and require a case-by-case inquiry into the "totality of the circumstances."
• Because 28 U.S.C. § 994(t) only expressly prohibits "rehabilitation of the defendant alone" as a reason for release, Congress impliedly authorized district courts to consider all other relevant information.
• District courts possess broad discretion to consider all relevant information when modifying a sentence, as established in *Concepcion v. United States*.
• The Sentencing Commission's 2023 amended policy statement, which adds "Unusually Long Sentence" as a valid reason for release, should be binding on the courts.

• Nonretroactive amendments to criminal penalties are the norm and reflect Congress's interest in finality and avoiding additional litigation.
• Treating a nonretroactive disparity as a "compelling" reason would undermine Congress's deliberate choice to leave existing sentences intact.
• Compassionate release is traditionally limited to a prisoner's personal circumstances, such as medical conditions, age, and family situations, rather than legal disparities.
• The Sentencing Commission's policy statements must be consistent with the governing statute and cannot override the will of Congress.

• The Court held that a sentencing disparity resulting from a nonretroactive change to sentencing law cannot serve as an "extraordinary and compelling" reason for a reduction under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i).
• The Court defined "extraordinary" as "most unusual" or "far from common" and "compelling" as "tending to convince or convert by or as if by forcefulness of evidence."
• Relying on *Dorsey v. United States* and *Hewitt v. United States*, the Court reasoned that nonretroactive amendments are the "ordinary practice," making such disparities unexceptional rather than "extraordinary."
• The Court found the disparity not "compelling" because it would contradict Congress's decision to apply lower sentences only to some violators of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) to ensure finality.
• The Court noted that compassionate release is historically centered on personal circumstances, not legal disparities.
• Regarding 28 U.S.C. § 994(t), the Court rejected the "negative implication" that ruling out rehabilitation alone authorizes all other considerations, citing *NLRB v. SW General, Inc.*
• The Court distinguished *Concepcion v. United States*, noting that *Concepcion* dealt with the extent of a reduction where eligibility was already conceded, whereas this case concerns the "gatekeeping requirement" of eligibility.
• The Court warned that allowing such reductions would permit judges to reject mandatory minimums ordained by the legislature, violating the principle in *United States v. Wiltberger* that the legislature, not the Court, ordains punishment.
• The Court concluded that the Sentencing Commission's 2023 policy statement is invalid to the extent it conflicts with the statute, as courts must independently interpret the law per *Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo*.