Does the government's prosecution of an individual under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(3) for possessing a firearm while being an "unlawful user" of a controlled substance violate the Second Amendment? Specifically, is the automatic disarmament of regular marijuana users consistent with the Nation's historical tradition of firearm regulation? This case asks whether such a categorical ban applies even when there is no evidence that the individual is dangerous or incapacitated.

• The government argues that 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(3) is consistent with historical "habitual drunkard" laws, which it claims are "relevantly similar" analogues.
• It contends these historical laws targeted individuals who regularly used intoxicants for the same reason the modern statute does.
• It asserts that both the historical analogues and § 922(g)(3) aim to protect the public from "unusually dangerous" individuals who commit "violent crimes."
• It maintains that historical laws operated similarly by detaining people in workhouses or jails, which effectively functioned as a temporary disarmament.

• Respondent argues that the government's effort to enforce 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(3) against him violates the Second Amendment.
• He contends that he is not a drug addict and that his use of marijuana does not render him a danger to himself or others.
• He asserts that the government's ban is unconstitutional because it disarms him regardless of how safely he keeps the firearm or why he possesses it in his home.
• He argues that there is no historical tradition of disarming individuals based solely on regular drug use without a showing of dangerousness.

• The Court held that the government's prosecution of respondent under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(3)'s unlawful user provision is inconsistent with the Second Amendment.
• Applying the test from *New York State Rifle & Pistol Assn., Inc. v. Bruen*, the Court found that because the conduct is presumptively protected, the government bore the burden of showing the regulation is "consistent with the Nation's historical tradition of firearm regulation."
• The Court rejected the government's analogy to "habitual drunkard" laws, finding they differ in "why" (target and purpose) and "how" (operation).
• Regarding the target, the Court noted that historical laws targeted those who were "incapable of conducting [their] own affairs" (*Ark. Rev. Stat., ch. 78, § 1*) or "mentally incompetent" (*Minn. Terr. Rev. Stat., ch. 67, § 12*), whereas § 922(g)(3) automatically disarms anyone who regularly uses any amount of any controlled substance regardless of incapacitation.
• Regarding purpose, the Court found that historical vagrancy and civil-commitment laws sought to promote productivity or protect families from financial ruin, not specifically to prevent "violent crimes."
• Regarding operation, the Court observed that historical laws required pre-deprivation process (such as convictions or probate court proceedings), while § 922(g)(3) divests the right to bear arms automatically without such process.
• The Court noted that the Controlled Substances Act (*21 U.S.C. § 801(2)*) is designed to protect "the health and general welfare of the American people," making it unclear if § 922(g)(3) actually confines its reach to those who are "categorically and unusually dangerous."
• The Court highlighted that the government's own actions—including rescheduling marijuana products and directing prosecutors to curtail enforcement against users—undercut the claim that regular marijuana users are categorically dangerous.