Blanche, Acting Attorney General v. Muk Choi Lau
No. 25-429 · Decided June 23, 2026 · vacated and remanded
Does the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) require a border officer to possess clear and convincing evidence that a lawful permanent resident has committed a crime involving moral turpitude before deeming that resident an applicant for admission? The Immigration and Nationality Act does not require a border officer to have clear and convincing evidence that a lawful permanent resident has committed a crime involving moral turpitude before deeming the resident an applicant for admission.
CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT · Argued April 22, 2026
Parties — Petitioner: BLANCHE, ACTING ATTORNEY GENERAL · Respondent: MUK CHOI LAU
Vote & lineup6–3 on the judgment. Thomas delivered the opinion of the Court, joined by Roberts, Alito, Gorsuch, Kavanaugh, Barrett (6). Dissent(s): Jackson (joined by Sotomayor, Kagan).
Who prevailed — The petitioner prevailed on the legal standard regarding the evidentiary burden at the border, although the case was remanded to the Second Circuit to determine if Lau's specific crime involved moral turpitude.
The question

Does the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) require a border officer to possess clear and convincing evidence that a lawful permanent resident has committed a crime involving moral turpitude before deeming that resident an applicant for admission? This determination affects whether the resident is treated as already admitted or as seeking admission, which in turn determines if they are subject to inadmissibility or deportability grounds. The case specifically addresses whether such evidence must be present at the border or can be established later during removal proceedings.

Petitioner's argument
  • Lawful permanent residents who have "committed" a crime identified in § 1182(a)(2) may be regarded as seeking admission under § 1101(a)(13)(C)(v).
  • The INA does not impose a clear-and-convincing-evidence burden on border officers who must make "quick judgments on the spot," citing *Luz Munoz v. Holder*.
  • Any burden to establish that an alien is an applicant for admission is satisfied at the time of the removal hearing, not at the border.
  • The Government's charge of inadmissibility was proper because Lau had committed a crime involving moral turpitude before attempting reentry and was subsequently convicted.
Respondent's argument
  • Border officers must have "clear and convincing" evidence that a lawful permanent resident actually committed the crime in question at the time of reentry to justify deeming them an applicant for admission.
  • The clear-and-convincing-evidence standard applied by the Board of Immigration Appeals during removal proceedings should also apply to border officers' determinations.
  • A lawful permanent resident may be regarded as seeking admission only after being convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude, relying on dictum in *Vartelas v. Holder*.
The decision
  • The Court held that the INA does not require border officers to have clear and convincing evidence that a lawful permanent resident committed a crime involving moral turpitude before deeming them an applicant for admission.
  • The Court applied a two-step test for removing LPRs on inadmissibility: step one requires only the "commission" of the crime to regard the alien as seeking admission, while step two requires "conviction (or admission)" to prove they are inadmissible, citing *Barton v. Barr*.
  • The Court found that nothing in the text of the INA imposes a clear-and-convincing-evidence burden on the Government to establish that an alien is an applicant for admission.
  • It noted that while the INA specifies burdens of proof in other contexts—such as § 1229a(c)(2) and (3)—it is silent regarding the border officer's initial determination.
  • The Court rejected the Second Circuit's reliance on *Matter of Valenzuela-Felix*, ruling that this BIA precedent imposes a burden only "at the time of the removal hearing," not at the border.
  • The Court determined that the Government satisfied its burden at the hearing because Lau's guilty plea constituted clear and convincing evidence that he had committed the crime before attempting reentry.
  • Regarding § 1101(a)(13)(C)(v), the Court reasoned that the phrase "has committed" allows the Government to regard an LPR as seeking admission even if the conviction occurs later, citing *Barton v. Barr*.
  • The Court concluded that § 1101(a)(13)(C)(v) incorporates only the crimes identified in § 1182(a)(2), not the requirement of a prior conviction.
Separate opinions
Jackson, dissenting (joined by Sotomayor, Kagan)
  • Argues that the "shall not" language in § 1101(a)(13)(C) creates a mandatory default rule that LPRs are already admitted unless the Government determines an exception applies *before* divesting that status at the border.
  • Contends that allowing post hoc justification via later conviction undermines the statutory scheme and exposes LPRs to severe consequences, such as the confiscation of their permanent green card and "immigration limbo."
  • Asserts that the present-perfect tense used in § 1101(a)(13)(C)(i)–(v) indicates the statute was written for use by border officers at the time of entry, not retrospectively by immigration judges.
Read the full opinion on supremecourt.gov (PDF) →