The case asks when an alien seeking entry from Mexico "arrives in the United States" under 8 U. S. C. §§ 1158(a)(1) and 1225(a)(1). Specifically, it considers whether this occurs while the alien is standing in Mexico at the border or only after they cross into the country. This determination dictates whether an alien is entitled to inspection and may apply for asylum.

• The phrase "arrives in" carries its ordinary meaning, which requires physical entry into the geographic location of the United States.
• The INA distinguishes between actual entrance and attempted entrance in other sections, implying that "arrives in" excludes mere attempts to enter.
• Metering is a necessary tool to manage border surges and maintain safe and sanitary conditions at ports of entry.
• The 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees does not prohibit the Government from refusing entry to aliens who are outside its territory.

• An alien "arrives in" the United States when they are at the threshold and attempting to enter, even if blocked by officials.
• Under the canon against surplusage, "arrives in" must have a distinct meaning from "physically present in the United States" as used in 8 U. S. C. § 1158(a)(1).
• The Government's interpretation creates perverse incentives for aliens to enter the country illegally rather than waiting at ports of entry.
• Refusing inspection and asylum processing to those at the border violates international obligations under the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees.

• An alien "arrives in the United States" only when they cross the border; standing in Mexico and attempting entry is insufficient to trigger the requirements of 8 U. S. C. §§ 1158(a)(1) and 1225(a)(1).
• The Court applied the ordinary meaning of "arrive" ("reach a destination") and "in" ("within the limits, bounds, or area of"), citing the American Heritage Dictionary, Webster's Third New International Dictionary, and Oxford English Dictionary.
• Statutory context supports this reading because other INA provisions—such as 8 U. S. C. §§ 1325(a)(1), 1326(a)(2)(B), and 1357(a)(2)—explicitly distinguish between actual entry and "attempt[ing] to enter."
• The Court noted that Congress could have used phrases like "arrives at" or "near a land border," as seen in 8 U. S. C. § 1103(a)(10), but chose not to do so in the provisions at issue.
• Regarding the amendment by the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRIRA), the Court presumed that replacing "at a land border or port of entry" with "arrives in the United States" was intended to have a substantial effect, per Van Buren v. United States.
• The Court rejected the canon against surplusage argument, stating it is subordinate to the cardinal canon that a legislature means what it says (United States Postal Service v. Konan) and noting that redundancy is permissible (Microsoft Corp. v. i4i Ltd. Partnership).
• The presumption against extraterritoriality tips the scale toward the Government's view because respondents' interpretation would give the statutes reach outside U.S. territory without unmistakable congressional intent, citing Morrison v. National Australia Bank Ltd. and RJR Nabisco, Inc. v. European Community.
• Based on Sale v. Haitian Centers Council, Inc., the Court held that Article 33 of the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees does not govern a nation's actions toward aliens outside its own territory.