Mullin, Secretary, Department of Homeland Security, et al. v. Doe et al.
No. 25-1083 · Decided June 25, 2026 · Reversed and remanded
Whether respondents challenging the termination of Temporary Protected Status (TPS) for nationals from Syria and Haiti are entitled to orders postponing those terminations during litigation. The Court held that the TPS statute bars judicial review of non-constitutional claims and that respondents are unlikely to succeed on their equal protection claim regarding the termination of Haiti's TPS designation.
CERTIORARI BEFORE JUDGMENT TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT · Argued April 29, 2026
Parties — Petitioner: MULLIN, SECRETARY, DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY, et al. · Respondent: DOE et al.
Vote & lineup6–3 on the judgment. Alito announced the judgment of the Court, joined by Roberts, Thomas, Kavanaugh, Gorsuch, Barrett (6). Dissent(s): Kagan (joined by Sotomayor, Jackson). Concurrence(s): Thomas.
Who prevailed — The petitioner prevailed in reversing the lower court orders that had postponed the terminations of Temporary Protected Status for Syria and Haiti.
The question

Whether respondents challenging the termination of Temporary Protected Status (TPS) for nationals from Syria and Haiti are entitled to orders postponing those terminations during litigation. This requires determining if the judicial-review bar in the TPS statute precludes challenges to the Secretary's decisions. Additionally, the Court must address whether a claim that the termination of Haiti's TPS was motivated by race violates the constitutional right to equal protection.

Petitioner's argument
  • The judicial-review bar in 8 U. S. C. § 1254a(b)(5)(A) precludes all non-constitutional challenges to the Secretary's determination regarding TPS termination.
  • The term "determination" is broad and encompasses both the final decision and the process leading up to it.
  • Regarding the equal protection claim, the Court should apply a deferential standard of review as established in Trump v. Hawaii.
  • The termination of Haiti's TPS was based on race-neutral policy justifications rather than racial animus.
Respondent's argument
  • The judicial-review bar in 8 U. S. C. § 1254a(b)(5)(A) applies only to substantive determinations, not procedural errors such as the failure to consult with other agencies.
  • The term "determination" should be interpreted narrowly to refer only to assessments of country conditions.
  • Only the Secretary's ultimate determination is unreviewable, while subsidiary decisions remain subject to judicial review.
  • The termination of Haiti's TPS designation violated the constitutional right to equal protection because it was motivated by race.
The decision
  • The Court held that 8 U. S. C. § 1254a(b)(5)(A) bars judicial review of all non-constitutional claims regarding the termination of a TPS designation.
  • The Court reasoned that "determination" can mean either an individual decision or the process leading to a decision, and the phrase "with respect to" broadens the scope to cover matters relating to that subject, citing Patel v. Garland.
  • It rejected the argument that the bar applies only to substantive claims, noting that procedural steps are also determinations; it distinguished McNary v. Haitian Refugee Center, Inc. and Bowen v. Michigan Academy of Family Physicians as turning on different statutory wording.
  • The Court declined to give "determination" a technical meaning limited to country conditions, applying the principle from Yellen v. Confederated Tribes of Chehalis Reservation that common terms be given their ordinary meaning.
  • It applied the administrative-law principle from Army Corps of Engineers v. Hawkes Co. that subsidiary decisions merge into final agency action, meaning if the final action is unreviewable, so are the subsidiary determinations.
  • Regarding the equal protection claim, the Court assumed for argument's sake that heightened scrutiny under Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development Corp. applied, requiring a showing that "discriminatory purpose [was] a motivating factor in the decision."
  • The Court concluded the claim was unlikely to succeed because the cited statements by the President and Secretary were not overtly racial and could be based on race-neutral justifications, such as general opposition to the TPS program.
Separate opinions
Thomas, concurring
  • Argues that 8 U. S. C. § 1254a(b)(5)(A) bars all judicial review, including constitutional claims, and that the canon of constitutional avoidance does not apply because the text is unambiguous.
  • Contends that aliens have no equal protection rights against the Federal Government because the Fourteenth Amendment applies only to States and the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause does not contain an implicit equal protection component, critiquing Bolling v. Sharpe.
Kagan, dissenting (joined by Sotomayor, Jackson)
  • Argues that "determination" refers to a final decision and should not include pre-determination procedural steps like the mandatory consultation required by 8 U. S. C. § 1254a(b)(3)(A).
  • Asserts that the Secretary failed to properly consult with appropriate agencies, as the communications were about "foreign policy concerns" rather than country conditions.
  • Contends that the President's statements regarding Haitians provide sufficient evidence of racial animus to satisfy the Arlington Heights standard.
Read the full opinion on supremecourt.gov (PDF) →