Does the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA) expressly preempt a state-law failure-to-warn claim alleging that a pesticide label should have included a cancer warning? This occurs in a context where the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) has repeatedly evaluated the product and approved its label without such a warning. The Court must determine if requiring an additional warning under state tort law constitutes a requirement "in addition to or different from" those required under federal law.

• FIFRA’s preemption clause, 7 U.S.C. § 136v(b), prohibits states from imposing labeling requirements "in addition to or different from" those required under the Act.
• Because the EPA approved Roundup's label without a cancer warning, federal law requires Monsanto to use that specific label unless and until the EPA approves a change.
• A state tort claim requiring a cancer warning imposes a labeling requirement that differs from and adds to existing federal obligations.
• The Court's decision in *Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc.* confirms that federal premarket approval of safety labels preempts contrary state-law safety requirements.

• A Missouri failure-to-warn claim is consistent with FIFRA because both the state law and the federal misbranding prohibition require manufacturers to provide adequate warnings to protect human health.
• Under 7 U.S.C. § 136a(f)(2), registration of a pesticide cannot be construed as a defense for the commission of any offense under FIFRA, suggesting that EPA approval is not conclusive.
• The EPA's regulations regarding "precautionary statements" (40 CFR §§ 156.60–156.70) apply only to acute hazards and do not create specific federal requirements for chronic risks like cancer.
• State tort suits serve as a necessary catalyst to encourage manufacturers to update labels in light of new safety information, as noted in *Bates v. Dow Agrosciences LLC*.

• The Court held that FIFRA expressly preempts the state-law failure-to-warn claim because it would require Monsanto to add a cancer warning not required by federal law.
• Under 7 U.S.C. § 136v(b), "Uniformity" is mandated, meaning states cannot impose labeling requirements "in addition to or different from those required under this subchapter."
• The Court noted that state tort duties constitute state labeling requirements, citing *Bates v. Dow Agrosciences LLC*, *Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc.*, and *Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc.*.
• To register a pesticide, the EPA must determine that the label contains all warnings "necessary and . . . adequate to protect health and the environment" and is not "false or misleading" under 7 U.S.C. §§ 136a(c)(5)(B) and 136(q)(1)(A), (G).
• Once approved, manufacturers are legally required to use that label unless the EPA approves a change, per 7 U.S.C. § 136a(f)(1) and 40 CFR §§ 152.44(a), 156.70(c).
• The Court applied the reasoning from *Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc.*, finding that FDA premarket approval of medical devices under a nearly identical clause (21 U.S.C. § 360k(a)) preempted additional state safety requirements.
• The Court distinguished *Bates v. Dow Agrosciences LLC* by clarifying that while efficacy claims may not be preempted, safety claims are thoroughly reviewed at registration and thus fall under the preemption clause.
• The Court rejected the argument regarding 7 U.S.C. § 136a(f)(2), stating it applies to EPA enforcement actions for violating FIFRA, not to state tort suits.