Trump, President of the United States, et al. v. Slaughter
No. 25-332 · Decided June 29, 2026 · Reversed and remanded
Does the Federal Trade Commission's statutory provision limiting the President's removal of Commissioners to "inefficiency, neglect of duty, or malfeasance in office" violate the separation of powers? The Federal Trade Commission's statutory provision limiting the President's removal of Commissioners to "inefficiency, neglect of duty, or malfeasance in office" is unconstitutional because it violates the separation of powers by restricting the President's authority to remove executive officers at will.
Vote & lineup6–3 on the judgment. Roberts delivered the opinion of the Court, joined by Alito, Gorsuch, Kavanaugh, Barrett, Thomas (6). Dissent(s): Sotomayor (joined by Kagan, Jackson). Concurrence(s): Gorsuch.
The question
Does the Federal Trade Commission's statutory provision limiting the President's removal of Commissioners to "inefficiency, neglect of duty, or malfeasance in office" violate the separation of powers? Specifically, does the Constitution grant the President the authority to remove such executive officers at will regardless of statutory restrictions? The case asks whether *Humphrey's Executor v. United States* remains valid law in protecting the tenure of members of a multimember regulatory agency.
Petitioner's argument
- The Constitution vests "[t]he executive Power" in a single President under Art. II, § 1, cl. 1, requiring a hierarchy where subordinates are subject to his superintendence.
- The "Decision of 1789" and *Myers v. United States* establish that the President must be able to remove those executing the laws at will to ensure accountability.
- The FTC's functions—promulgating rules, investigating businesses, and filing civil suits—are quintessentially executive and thus must be controlled by the Chief Executive.
- *Humphrey's Executor v. United States* is based on an outdated "quasi-legislative" and "quasi-judicial" distinction that no longer reflects the reality of the FTC's power.
Respondent's argument
- The for-cause removal provision in 15 U. S. C. § 41 is constitutional under the precedent set by *Humphrey's Executor v. United States*.
- Congress may "reasonably" decide that certain expert agencies should be insulated from partisan political control to ensure impartiality and continuity.
- The Court should respect the reliance interests of Congress and the public who have operated under a system of independent agencies for nearly a century.
- Historical examples, such as early multimember commissions, suggest that the Founders accepted some level of independence for certain government functions.
The decision
- The Court held that the FTC's for-cause removal provision is contrary to the separation of powers enshrined in the Constitution.
- Under Art. II, §§ 1 and 3, the President must be able to remove subordinates at will to fulfill the duty to "take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed" and maintain a unitary executive hierarchy (*Federalist No. 70*).
- The Court relied on the "Decision of 1789," where the First Congress endorsed the view that removal is an Executive power that the Legislature cannot diminish or modify.
- The Court reaffirmed *Myers v. United States*, which held that the President has general administrative control over those executing the laws, including the power of removal.
- The Court explicitly overruled *Humphrey's Executor v. United States*, finding its "quasi-legislative" and "quasi-judicial" reasoning flawed and inconsistent with later cases like *Morrison v. Olson*, *Free Enterprise Fund v. Public Company Accounting Oversight Bd.*, and *Seila Law LLC v. Consumer Financial Protection Bureau*.
- The Court determined that the FTC exercises executive power because it promulgates substantive rules carrying the force of law, conducts in-house adjudications, and files civil suits on behalf of the United States.
- Because these activities fall within the "heartland of executive power," the President must have at-will removal authority over the Commissioners to ensure they remain accountable to him and he remains accountable to the people.
Separate opinions
Gorsuch, concurring
- Argues that while the President should control executive power, the delegation of legislative and judicial powers to agencies creates a risk of accumulating too much power in one hand (*Federalist No. 47*).
- Suggests the Court must now use the nondelegation doctrine, major questions doctrine, and Article III protections to restore these powers to Congress and the courts.
Sotomayor, dissenting (joined by Kagan, Jackson)
- Argues that *Humphrey's Executor v. United States* remains valid and reflects a "deeply rooted tradition" of creating independent agencies to ensure impartiality.
- Contends the majority ignores significant reliance interests and misinterprets historical evidence, such as *Marbury v. Madison* and early commissions like the Sinking Fund Commission.
- Claims that at-will removal risks transforming the Executive Branch into an instrument of partisan oppression rather than a neutral administrator of law.