Does the counting of absentee ballots postmarked by election day but received up to five days later violate federal election-day statutes? Specifically, do 3 U.S.C. § 1 and 2 U.S.C. §§ 1 and 7 require that ballots be received by election day? The Court must determine if these federal laws preempt Mississippi's statute allowing a five-day grace period for ballot receipt.

• Federal law sets the date for "election," which refers to the act of casting a vote rather than the administrative act of receiving it.
• The Uniformed and Overseas Citizens Absentee Voting Act (UOCAVA) indicates that state laws, not federal law, govern ballot-receipt deadlines.
• Historical voting practices from the 19th century do not "trap in amber" modern election administration.
• Policy concerns regarding election integrity and fraud are matters for legislatures to resolve, not courts.

• The term "election" in federal statutes refers to two distinct acts—ballot casting and ballot receipt—meaning the deadline applies to both.
• Historical practice, particularly during the Civil War, demonstrates that states required ballots to be received by election day to comply with federal requirements.
• *Foster v. Love* defines an election as "combined actions of voters and officials," which should be interpreted to include the receipt of ballots.
• Allowing post-election-day receipt threatens election integrity and increases the risk of fraud.

• The Court held that federal election-day statutes do not prevent Mississippi from counting absentee ballots postmarked by election day but received up to five days later.
• Applying a "fundamental canon of statutory construction" cited in *New Prime Inc. v. Oliveira*, the Court determined that "election" must be interpreted by its ordinary meaning at the time of enactment, which is "[t]he act of choosing a person to fll an offce" (N. Webster, 1869).
• The Court reasoned that the electorate's choice is made when voting is complete, not when ballots are received, invoking *United States v. Classic* to define election as the "expression by qualifed electors of their choice of candidates."
• The Court noted that 3 U.S.C. § 21(1) defines "election day" with reference to "voting," which indicates that "voting" is the specific act governed by the statute.
• The Court found that the Uniformed and Overseas Citizens Absentee Voting Act (UOCAVA), specifically 52 U.S.C. §§ 20303(b)(3) and 20304(b)(1), presupposes that ballot receipt is a matter of state law.
• The Court observed that Art. II, § 1, cl. 4 of the Constitution requires the day electors "give their Votes" to be uniform but says nothing about the day for receipt, envisioning a system where receipt is divorced from voting.
• The Court rejected the reliance on *Foster v. Love*, stating it only held that an election may not be "consummated prior to federal election day" and specifically refused to isolate which acts must be done on that day.
• The Court dismissed policy arguments regarding fraud, citing *SAS Institute Inc. v. Iancu* to state that such concerns are properly directed to legislatures.