Whether the Federal Election Campaign Act's (FECA) limits on political-party coordinated expenditures violate the First Amendment. Specifically, the Court must determine if these limits remain constitutional in light of recent jurisprudence regarding campaign finance. The central issue is whether such limits are necessary to prevent the circumvention of base contribution limits through earmarked contributions to parties.

• Political parties possess a First Amendment right to spend money on political advertising and other campaign activities in coordination with their candidates.
• The precedent established in *Federal Election Comm'n v. Colorado Republican Federal Campaign Comm.* (*Colorado II*) is no longer good law due to significant changes in the Court's First Amendment jurisprudence since 2001.
• The Government already possesses less-restrictive tools to prevent the circumvention of contribution limits, specifically earmarking and disclosure laws.
• The relative power of political parties has diminished compared to outside groups over the last 25 years, undermining a key premise of *Colorado II*.

• Coordinated expenditure limits are necessary to prevent donors from circumventing base contribution limits by using political parties as conduits to fund candidates.
• Earmarking and disclosure rules alone are insufficient because they cannot detect all forms of circumvention, such as those involving joint fundraising committees.
• The Court should adhere to the precedent set in *Colorado II* under the principle of stare decisis.
• Without these caps, political parties could serve as "alternative checking accounts" for campaigns, facilitating quid pro quo corruption.

• The Court held that FECA's political-party coordinated-expenditure limits, found in 52 U. S. C. § 30116(d), violate the First Amendment.
• The Court applied "closely drawn" scrutiny, a rigorous standard from *McCutcheon v. Federal Election Comm'n* and *Federal Election Comm'n v. Ted Cruz for Senate*, requiring that regulations not be "disproportionate" and be "necessary" and "narrowly tailored."
• The Court noted that the only constitutionally permissible government objective for campaign finance restrictions is preventing "quid pro quo corruption," defined as a direct exchange of an official act for money.
• The Court rejected justifications based on reducing wasteful spending, preventing "undue influence," or limiting the appearance of mere access, citing *McCutcheon* and *Cruz*.
• Regarding the anti-circumvention interest, the Court found that the combination of base contribution limits, earmarking rules under 52 U. S. C. § 30116(a)(8), and disclosure requirements under 52 U. S. C. § 30104(b) already serve as sufficient prophylactic measures.
• The Court reasoned that modern technology, particularly the Internet, has made disclosure a much more robust tool against corruption than it was when *Colorado II* was decided.
• Because these less-restrictive tools exist and there is no evidence from state-level experience of widespread quid pro quo corruption resulting from unlimited coordinated expenditures, the FECA limits are "disproportionate" and not "necessary."
• Consequently, the Court overruled *Federal Election Comm'n v. Colorado Republican Federal Campaign Comm.* (*Colorado II*), finding it was an outlier inconsistent with subsequent precedents.