West Virginia et al. v. B. P. J., by Her Next Friend and Mother, Heather Jackson
No. 24-43 · Decided June 30, 2026 · reversed and remanded
Whether schools may maintain women's and girls' sports teams for biological females under Title IX and the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Schools may maintain women's and girls' sports teams for biological females and determine eligibility based on biological sex under both Title IX and the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT · Argued January 13, 2026
Parties — Petitioner: WEST VIRGINIA et al. · Respondent: B. P. J., BY HER NEXT FRIEND AND MOTHER, HEATHER JACKSON
Vote & lineup6–3 on the judgment. Kavanaugh delivered the opinion of the Court, joined by Roberts, Thomas, Alito, Gorsuch, Barrett (6). Dissent(s): Sotomayor (joined by Kagan, Jackson); Jackson. Concurrence(s): Thomas, Gorsuch.
Who prevailed — The petitioners (West Virginia and Idaho) prevailed in that the Court held their respective laws maintaining female sports for biological females are lawful.
The question

Whether schools may maintain women's and girls' sports teams for biological females under Title IX and the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Specifically, the Court addresses whether schools may determine eligibility for female sports based on biological sex. This inquiry involves evaluating laws from West Virginia and Idaho that prohibit biological males from participating on female teams.

Petitioner's argument
  • Limiting women's and girls' sports to biological females is necessary to promote equal athletic opportunities for women and girls.
  • Biological males possess inherent physical advantages in height, weight, strength, speed, endurance, and jumping ability that create safety risks in contact sports and undermine competitive fairness.
  • The term "sex" as used in Title IX and related regulations refers specifically to biological sex.
Respondent's argument
  • Schools should make exceptions for biological males who identify as female and have taken puberty blockers or hormones to mitigate physical advantages.
  • If Title IX regulations authorize limiting teams to biological females without exception, they are not "reasonable" as required by the Javits Amendment.
  • The categorical exclusion of transgender athletes violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
The decision
  • Title IX allows schools to provide separate sports teams defined by biological sex, and West Virginia's policy is consistent with this statute.
  • The Court held that "sex" in 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a), the Javits Amendment (§ 844, 88 Stat. 612), and 34 CFR §§ 106.41(b), (c) refers to biological sex based on its ordinary meaning in the early 1970s, citing *Frontiero v. Richardson*.
  • The Court found that separate teams for biological males and females are "reasonable" under the Javits Amendment because they address inherent physical differences, safety risks, and competitive fairness.
  • Under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, sex-based classifications are subject to intermediate scrutiny, requiring the classification to be "substantially related" to an "important" government objective (*United States v. Skrmetti*).
  • The Court determined that safety and competitive fairness are important government interests.
  • Limiting female sports to biological females is substantially related to those interests, citing *Skrmetti*, *Tuan Anh Nguyen v. INS*, and *Michael M. v. Superior Court, Sonoma Cty.*.
  • The Court rejected the "as-applied" argument that states must grant individualized exemptions for transgender athletes, ruling that validity depends on the relation to the overall problem rather than individual cases (*Ward v. Rock Against Racism* and *United States v. Edge Broadcasting Co.*).
  • Following *Skrmetti*, the Court held that these laws classify based on biological sex rather than gender identity or transgender status, thus satisfying rational basis review or intermediate scrutiny.
Separate opinions
Thomas, concurring
  • Argues transgender status is not a suspect class because "gender dysphoria" is a mutable mental state rather than an immutable characteristic (*United States v. Skrmetti*).
  • Asserts that sex is binary and biological, and using language to obscure this reality is a failure to treat citizens as equals.
Gorsuch, concurring
  • Notes Title IX was enacted under the Spending Clause (*Jackson v. Birmingham Bd. of Ed.*) and does not clearly prohibit restricting teams to biological women.
  • Argues *Bostock v. Clayton County* is not applicable because it did not address sex-segregated sports or facilities.
Sotomayor, concurring in part and dissenting in part (joined by Kagan, Jackson)
  • Agrees that the Title IX claim fails based on the parties' concessions regarding the meaning of "sex."
  • Dissents on Equal Protection grounds, arguing the Court should have allowed factual development to determine if certain transgender girls are similarly situated to cisgender girls (*Caban v. Mohammed*, *United States v. Virginia*).
Jackson, concurring in part and dissenting in part
  • Joins Justice Sotomayor's opinion in full.
  • Argues that Title IX's definition of "sex" could be interpreted more broadly than biological sex to protect against gender-based stereotypes (*Davis v. Monroe County Bd. of Ed.* and *Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins*).
Read the full opinion on supremecourt.gov (PDF) →